Churchill's Spy Files Read online

  Courtesy of Nicola Loud

  First published 2018

  The History Press

  The Mill, Brimscombe Port

  Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QG

  www.thehistorypress.co.uk

  © Nigel West, 2018

  The right of Nigel West to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

  All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without the permission in writing from the Publishers.

  British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data.

  A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

  ISBN 978 0 7509 8549 9

  Typesetting and origination by The History Press

  eBook converted by Geethik Technologies

  CONTENTS

  Foreword by Jonathan Evans, Director-General of MI5, 2007–2013

  Acknowledgements

  Abbreviations

  Introduction

  The Monthly Reports

  1First Report, 2 April 1943

  2Second Report, 2 May 1943

  3Third Report, 1 June 1943

  4Fourth Report, 2 July 1943

  5Fifth Report, 1 September 1943

  6Sixth Report

  7Seventh Report, 1 November 1943

  8Eighth Report, 1 December 1943

  9Ninth Report, 1 January 1944

  10Tenth Report, 1 February 1944

  11Ninth Report, 7 March 1944

  12Churchill Intervenes

  133 April 1944

  145 May 1944

  153 June 1944

  163 July 1944

  171 August 1944

  18August 1944, undated

  195 October 1944

  203 November 1944

  2112 December 1944

  226 January 1945

  2319 February 1945

  245 March 1945

  25March and April 1945, undated

  2611 June 1945

  27HARLEQUIN

  28GARBO

  Postscript

  Appendix 1Espionage Cases

  Appendix 2MI5 Double-Agents

  Notes

  FOREWORD

  Within Whitehall the Security Service enjoys a unique position, and the Director-General, although answerable to the Home Secretary, has direct access to the Prime Minister. The Service is not an instrument of political power but it operates within a political environment. The delicate balance between the political world and the political neutrality of the Security Service in defending national security depends to a large degree on the relationship between the D-G and the government of the day, including the Prime Minister.

  Despite the programme of declassification initiated by my predecessor Sir Stephen Lander, very little is known about how the first D-G, Sir Vernon Kell, coped with successive Prime Ministers until he was dismissed by Winston Churchill in June 1940.

  It fell to Sir David Petrie to restore confidence in MI5, which was then almost overwhelmed by the pressures of an unexpected war, and to satisfy the coalition government that the Security Service, long regarded with some suspicion by the incoming Home Secretary Herbert Morrison, was up to the challenge of countering Axis espionage and sabotage, as well as acting professionally and without partisan prejudice in a counter-subversion role.

  This was the historical background to the decision to provide regular briefings to the PM, and though the practice was discontinued when Clement Attlee took up residence in No. 10, it was subsequently re-introduced, particularly in the post-Cold War era, when the Service had become the front line in combating terrorist threats. The nature of the threat meant that, especially after 9/11, a much closer relationship developed between Thames House and Downing Street.

  During my six years as D-G it fell to me to brief Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron on a range of sensitive operations and, based on that experience, I can appreciate the delicacy of Petrie’s task: how much to impart without compromising the operational independence of the Service, enshrined in law, and how much detail the Prime Minister needed to know in order to understand the threat facing the country, without burdening him or her with unnecessary detail.

  Now, for the first time, we have the chance to see the papers put before Churchill and, with the benefit of hindsight, we can come to acknowledge the fine judgement exercised by Petrie and his supremely able subordinate, Guy Liddell.

  The reports to Churchill (and to him alone) demonstrate MI5’s global reach, its links with Allied agencies, its skilful and imaginative exploitation of precarious sources of information, and the sheer quality of personnel engaged in a struggle with a very determined adversary operating worldwide. In many ways, it might seem that not much has changed.

  Lord Evans of Weardale

  Former Director-General of MI5

  2018

  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

  The author is indebted to those wartime MI5 agents who assisted his research, among them Dusan Popov (TRICYCLE), Ivo Popov (DREADNOUGHT), Elvira de Chaudoir (BRONX), Harry Williamson (TATE), Eugn Sostaric (METEOR), the Marquis deBona (FREAK), Ib Riis (COBWEB), Juan Pujol (GARBO), Eddie Chapman (ZIGZAG), Roman Garby-Czerniawski (BRUTUS), John Moe (MUTT), Tor Glad (JEFF) and the MI5 officers Tommy Robertson, Ian Wilson, Jack Bingham, Norman Himsworth, Cyril Mills, Dick White, Herbert Hart, the Hon. Hugh Astor, Anthony Blunt, Victor Rothschild, Len Burt, John Maude, Peter Hope, Peter Ramsbotham, Gerald Glover, Sir Rupert Speir, Richard Darwall and Russell Lee.

  I am also grateful for the help given by Sigismund Best, Francois Grosjean, E.P.C. Greene; Rui Arajo, Mark Scoble, Douglas Wheeler, Etienne Verhoeyen, Ben de Jong, Gunter Peis, Joan Bright Astley, Margaret Blyth, Ed Lawler from OSS, and five SIS officers, Philip Johns, Cecil Gledhill, John Codrington, Ken Benton and Desmond Bristow, who were based in Iberia during the war; and Peter Falk, who was in Sweden.

  ABBREVIATIONS

  @

  Alias

  ACIC

  Allied Counter-Intelligence Centre, Iceland

  ADB1

  Assistant Director, MI5’s B1 section

  AEM

  Alto Estado Mayor

  AFHQ

  Allied Forces Headquarters

  ARP

  Air Raid Precautions

  ASDIC

  Anti-Submarine Detection

  ATS

  Auxiliary Territorial Service

  BSC

  British Security Coordination

  BUF

  British Union of Fascists

  C

  Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service

  CICI

  Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq

  COHQ

  Combined Operations Headquarters

  CPGB

  Communist Party of Great Britain

  CSDIC

  Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre

  Devlag

  German-Flemish Working Group

  DF

  Direction-Finding

  DOR

  Defence of the Realm Act

  DSO

  Defence Security Officer

  FFI

  French Forces of the Interior

  FSP

  Field Security Police

  FUSAG

  First United States Army Group

  GC&CS

  Government Code and Cipher School, Bletchley Park

  GOC

  General Officer Commanding

  IH

  Eins Heer

  IL

  Eins Luft


  IM

  Eins Marine

  ISK

  Intelligence Service Knox

  ISOS

  Intelligence Service Oliver Strachey

  JIC

  Joint Intelligence Committee

  KO

  Kriegsorganisation

  LRC

  London Reception Centre

  NKVD

  Soviet Intelligence Service

  OB

  Ossewa Brandweg

  OD

  Orde Dienst

  OGPU

  Soviet intelligence service

  OKW

  Oberkommando der Wehrmacht

  OSS

  Office of Strategic Services

  PLUTO

  Pipe Line Under The Ocean

  PoW

  Prisoner of War

  P-Plane

  V-1 flying bomb

  PRU

  Photographic Reconnaissance Unit

  PWE

  Political Warfare Executive

  RASC

  Royal Army Service Corps

  RCMP

  Royal Canadian Mounted Police

  RDF

  Radio Direction-Finding

  RHSA

  Reich Security Agency

  RIS

  Radio Intelligence Section

  RSLO

  Regional Security Liaison Officer

  RSS

  Radio Security Service

  R/T

  Radio-Telephony

  SCI

  Special Counter-Intelligence Unit

  SCO

  Security Control Officer

  SD

  Sicherheitsdienst

  SHAEF

  Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force

  SIE

  Servicio Informazione Extere

  SIGINT

  Signals Intelligence

  SIM

  Servicio Informazione Militare

  SIME

  Security Intelligence Middle East

  Sipo

  Sicherheitspolizei

  SIS

  Secret Intelligence Service

  W/T

  Wireless Telegraphy

  X-2

  OSS Counter-intelligence branch

  XX

  Double-Cross

  Code Names

  BIGOT

  Indoctrinated into invasion plans

  CROSSBOW

  German V-1 flying-bomb campaign

  OVERLORD

  D-Day invasion of Normandy

  PHOENIX

  D-Day harbour caissons

  TORCH

  Allied invasion of North Africa

  INTRODUCTION

  When in June 1942 Alfred Duff Cooper was given ministerial responsibility in the Cabinet for the British Security Service, MI5, he was not surprised by the secrecy surrounding the organisation and its operations, which hitherto had been largely undertaken under the aegis of the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office, but he was intrigued to learn about its activities and offered to share some of this information with the Prime Minister.

  Churchill had a long history of interest in, bordering on fascination with, secret intelligence, dating back to his period as Home Secretary in 1910 when he had introduced the first communications warrants to allow the interception of a suspect’s mail. He was enchanted by Cooper’s suggestion, as the newly appointed Chairman of the Home Defence Security Executive, replacing Lord Swinton, to have MI5’s Director-General, Sir David Petrie, prepare summary reports on what the country’s principal counter-espionage and counter-intelligence authority had been working on. As Petrie explained, this was an innovation as hitherto MI5 had not been keen to advertise its existence, let alone its clandestine role, but he recognised that support from 10 Downing Street was essential. Cooper wrote:

  My Dear Petrie,

  I had a talk with the Prime Minister on Sunday afternoon, in the course of which I told him about some of our recent activities and described some of the more interesting cases which have come under our control, such as the case of Chapman and Woerman. I also told him about the present we had recently received from the north of Scotland and the evidence that we had about the head of the Ossewa Brandweg. He was very much interested and I subsequently suggested to him that it would be a useful thing for him to receive a Monthly report on the activities of the Security Service. He entirely agreed. I think the furnishing of such a report would not only be useful from his point of view, in order that he night keep in touch with what is going on, but might also encourage those who are engaged in the work to feel that its importance is properly estimated, and the fact of it reached the highest authorities:

  If you agree, perhaps you would inform those concerned in order that such a report might be prepared to cover the present month. It is most important that it should not be a voluminous document as the Prime Minister is naturally overwhelmed with reading material and has very little time to devote to it. It should not consist, in my opinion, of more than two or three pages and should be confined to incidents of exceptional interest.

  Perhaps you will let me know what you think.

  The four cases referred to that Cooper thought would interest Churchill were those of Eddie Chapman, code-named ZIGZAG, who was one of the most remarkable double-agents of the war; the ultra-nationalist, pro-Nazi Ossewa Brandweg movement in South Africa; the defector ‘Woerman’, who was actually Major Richard Wurmann, formerly head of the Algiers Abstelle, code-named HARLEQUIN and alias Count Heinrich Stenboch; and the vague allusion to recent events in northern Scotland was a Luftwaffe parachute drop near Aberdeen of sabotage equipment for a pair of Norwegian double-agents, MUTT and JEFF.

  The day after Cooper wrote this, the matter was mentioned by Guy Liddell, the Director of MI5’s B Division, in charge of counter-espionage, in his diary:

  The Director-General has had a letter from Duff Cooper who, after consultation with the Prime Minister, has suggested that we should furnish the Prime Minister with a monthly report. It should not be too long and should only include items of major importance. It is suggested there should be contributions from Herbert Hart, Buster Milmo, T.A. Robertson, the London Reception Centre, Roger Hollis and occasionally items of interest received from Defence Security Officer points abroad. Dick White is going to get out a rough draft which we will then discuss. There are obvious advantages in selling ourselves to the Prime Minister who at the moment knows nothing about the activities of the department. On the other hand he may, on seeing some particular item, go off the deep end and want to take action, which will be disastrous to the work in hand.

  Clearly Liddell was worried by Churchill’s reputation for spontaneity and meddling, but a few days later, on 16 March, he discussed the matter with his senior subordinates, two from B Division and Hollis, in charge of the counter-subversion branch, F Division:

  I had a talk with Dick White, T.A. Robertson, and Roger Hollis about the monthly report for the Prime Minister. They were all a little apprehensive about Hollis’ contribution. The Prime Minister might speak to the Home Secretary about it and if the latter was not also informed we should find ourselves in trouble. We eventually decided to draft something and see what it looked like. Dick will be editor of the B Division material.

  What makes this material so remarkable is that it was prepared for the sole consumption of the Prime Minister, and not any of his staff, including his private secretaries, military advisers nor even Desmond Morton, his intelligence aide, seconded from the Secret Intelligence Service. Not even the Cabinet Secretary was a party to these reports, and no copies were retained within the Cabinet Office as every document was delivered to Churchill by hand by Petrie, who waited to offer a verbal briefing if required and then took the file back to his headquarters in St James’s Street. No one else, in an era when the word declassification had not been invented, was ever intended to have sight of the contents, thus allowing the authors to be both selective and candid.

  The task of
assembling the report was given by Liddell to his assistant, Dick White, and on 26 March he produced a covering memorandum explaining that the editorial work had been undertaken by Anthony Blunt:

  The attached paper has been prepared as the first report for Mr Duff Cooper to hand to the PM. The 2½ pages represent condensation from the original script turned into one by various sections amounting to something like 16 pages. These 16 pages were reduced in the first place, by Blunt merely as a precis exercise and then he and I discussed the preparation of this final draft.

  As a matter of policy we have not produced any sketch of the work of this office in retrospect as we considered that this would look too much as though we were out to advertise the office. It is surely up to Mr Duff Cooper to let the PM know what sort of things we do in general. The items we have included in this report have been chosen both because they may be expected to interest him in themselves and because they illustrate the type of work we do, at any rate in B Division. We have not had any contributions from E Division and indeed have not asked for them while I understand it is not considered advisable for Hollis to make any contribution at all.

  May I suggest that the procedure should be for Mr Duff Cooper to hand a report of this type to the PM. in a special file marked ‘personal for the PM only’ or some such wording and that it should be returned to Mr Duff Cooper after the PM has read it.